Blacklisted! II

Hiding In Plain Sight – The Laxness Files (Revised)

By Chay Lemoine

For almost twenty years I had the privilege of researching and writing about Nobel Prize winning Icelandic novelist Halldór Laxness. By obtaining declassified files, I contended that Halldór Laxness was the victim of literary blacklisting because of his political associations under the auspices of the FBI. Utilizing the Freedom of Information Act, I spent years requesting, appealing, changing tactics – hitting all the federal agencies that I felt harbored information that could complete the narrative of Halldór’s literary exile.

I did receive much information that proved that J. Edgar Hoover began the Laxness witch hunt. But there were missing files and one page that I felt was essential. After years of dead end searches several years ago, I decided to call it a career. I had published numerous articles in Iceland, Canada and the United States, featured in the documentary Anti-American Wins Nobel Prize and I made some good friends during in my search. I packed up my research papers plus some rare books and donated these to Gljufrasteinn, the Halldór Laxness Museum.

After a sixteen-year absence I took advantage of a late-night impulse and booked a trip to Iceland to visit friends and to buy as many bottles of Lysi as an American can legally carry out of the country. When I mentioned to the curator of Gljufrasteinn that I will be visiting Iceland she asked if I would like to speak and take part in a question-and-answer session. There is no greater honor. I felt as if I was going to be inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame. I of course immediately accepted.

I am aware that there are some that call into question the existence of the files or even that Halldór was blacklisted. The latter attack shows an ignorance of the Red Scare era in the United States. For some, history was made to be rewritten. It is in view of these arguments, and the fact that it would provide for interesting conversation during my talk, that I decided to pull out copies of the research material and see if there was more I could do to find the missing Laxness files. In 2004 when actively trying to gain access to the FBI files on Halldór I received some files that were seen for the first time and proved just how far the United States government was willing to go to enforce its political agenda. I was told that there were files that were not from the FBI and those files would need to be reviewed by the said agency. (I was not told the agency). I surmised that the missing files were from the CIA. The CIA refused to honor my request for the files. There is no doubt that there is something of interest in those files that I was denied access. When I received the original declassified FBI files in 2004, I received a call from the State Department asking me if I was “a journalist or an academic”. I was flattered to be called either, but I claimed to an “academic”. The State Department official asked what I was going to do with the files, and I explained they were going to be included in my Master’s Thesis but they arrived too late. I admitted I hadn’t even opened the envelope yet. It was on a flight to California where I was going to start a short consulting job that I first read the recently declassified files on Halldór. For the next several years I tried to gain access to the denied material.

After repeated requests, in 2007 in a letter from the CIA, it was acknowledged that the missing files were from the CIA and that I was denied access. I was told that the files were being sent to the State Department for review. In September of 2007, I received a letter saying that one page of the documents would jeopardize National Security. There was no appeal allowed on files that have a security risk, so there was no need to pursue that page any further. But there were other documents in Halldór’s file, and these were not classified as a National Security risk.

So, in 2008 I sent a request for help to Senator Barack Obama, the senator for my district. His office was kind enough to assist me in my search – and his office was also turned down. In 2010, I assumed I had a friend in the White House and contacted Secretary of State’s Hilary Clinton’s office. Perhaps I did have a friend, as the office took the time to place a phone call and asked me how they could help. I explained what I wanted and a week later I got another call saying that the CIA refused to release the files. I inquired if I could “ask a question regarding the files”. She tentatively agreed. I asked if the National Security one page file contained a name which could not be released. She said “yes”. In the years of searching, Senator Dick Durbin’s office also agreed to assist. I made phone calls to the offices of FBI FOI officials in the attempt to talk to them directly. It was years of frustration and denials.

In 2017 after the election of Donald Trump. I felt that the lack of “intellectual vigor” of the administration would possibly allow me to see those files. So, I filed yet another Freedom of Act request with the State Department. I was not surprised to hear that there were no files that had any information on Halldór Laxness. I was told that if the files are over 25 years old, they may have been sent to the National Archives. So, I filed a Freedom of Information act request with the National Archives. The official from The National Archives wrote a long and very informative letter. Finally, I received a response that showed an interest in assisting me. He told me that there were some old documents with Halldór’s name on them, but they were declassified long ago and not covered under the Freedom of Information Act. I could request them, but I recognized the file number as items of no interest.

After my planned visit to Iceland and my decision to revisit my research material I reread the letter from The National Archives. After years of receiving form letters, cursory responses written in governmental language, the letter from the National Archives seemed especially illuminating. The archivist was telling me that the files were not there. I was not paranoid enough to think that the files were destroyed. They were just not transferred to the National Archives. After the “national security page” was removed from Halldór’s files the additional files would be reviewed and then placed in the category of unclassified if the information was not sensitive. If that was the case the files were still in the State Department.

If the files were reviewed and declassified, then they should be readily available in the State Department Reading Room of declassified documents. The reading room is an online data base of some declassified files. I typed in “Halldór Laxness”. Five files appeared. I thought at first that this search may be connected to all Icelandic files, so I typed in “Iceland” and got two entirely different files. I typed many different key words, dates, including key words that seemed to be connected to the files showing in the Halldór search. These files showed up nowhere else. All of the files that appeared in the Halldór Laxness search were CIA files and all of them were referenced to Halldór Laxness. I felt confident I had found the missing documents.

I read over the files and found that Halldór’s name does not appear in any of the files. But a unique feature of the files was that they have one very important point in common; they all refer international clandestine activities. The files start in 1945 and end in 1949. Each file is a progression of how foreign espionage evolved. The files read like a short handbook of international espionage or reconnaissance. What first came to mind was the old Mission Impossible television series with top secret files and disintegrating tapes. I can imagine the file being thrown on the desk of Mr. Phelps with the caveat “your mission should you decide to accept it”. The first file is an interesting document from J. Edgar Hoover. The Hoover document is date September 21, 1945. On September 20, 1945, Truman asked the Secretary of State to develop an international intelligence program. Hoover wasted no time and the next day he dashed off his request. In this document to the Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Hoover petitions to have international clandestine operations designated under the auspices of the FBI (and no doubt under Hoover’s control). Hoover states in the document:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has in operation in the Western Hemisphere an intelligence plan based on simplicity of structure and flexibility of operation which has function efficiently, secretly, and especially since prior to Pearl Harbor, and has proved its adaptability to world-wide coverage by the effectiveness of its operation in the Western Hemisphere field.

Under the “Points for Consideration” section Hoover states:

“Foreign and domestic civil intelligence are inseparable and constitute one field of operation.”.

He uses Communism as an example of following the threat internationally. Hoover may have thought that Attorney General Clark would have rubber stamped this suggestion as he did to so many of Hoover’s wiretapping requests. But the other documents show that there were different options considered.

The next document dated October 25th discussed the combining the Army and Navy intelligence. The idea was to have an international intelligence program under the supervision of the Secretaries of the Army and Navy. This document is followed by a document dated December 15, 1945. This document reads as if the Army and Navy intelligence solution was creating some conflict regarding jurisdiction and budgeting.

The following document is dated August 14th, 1946. This document is of interest as it discussed the problem of the placement of military attaches in the consulates and the role these military attaches would play in world of international espionage. Should these military attaches be given the authority to conduct clandestine activities? Would other countries ask for the same arrangement at the embassies in the United States? Should these attaches be allowed to collect non-military intelligence? On the surface it would seem that the conflicts referenced in document had resulted in moving international espionage to a single agency.

The previous document beings to mind one of the first FBI declassified files I received written by Jack D. Neal, Chief of Foreign Activity Correlation dated September 5th 1947, to J. Edgar Hoover. The document states:

“Our legation in Iceland has requested us to inform them of the average monthly remittances Mr. Laxness has received in 1946 and thus far in 1947 for the sale of his book in the United States through the book-of-the-month club”.

This document ended with:

“If we obtain further information on Mr. Laxness, we shall forward it to you”.

It would not be unreasonable to replace the word “legation” with the word “operative” because it was obvious that in this situation the officials in the Icelandic embassy were spying on an Icelandic citizen in order to malign him for political purposes.

What I view as the most important document is dated 12/20/1949. Under the heading Assumptions parameters are given for international subversive activities:

2. That responsibility for these operations be not susceptible to public or direction attribution to the President or to individual cabinet members.

3. That authoritative controls exist to insure that in peace or war covert operation shall be restricted to projects which are clearly and directly in furtherance of national policy.

     1. Covert operations of a political, economic and psychological character,
     which by their nature remain truly covert and which are employed abroad to
     influence developments favorable to the United States…

After reading the documents I had to make some unsubstantiated inferences. Because these files had a direct relationship with the declassified files from the FBI, were from the CIA, and were currently in the State Department it was likely I had found some answers. I also had some questions? When were they placed in Halldór’s file? And why were they placed in Halldór’s file?

For obvious reasons I doubt the files were placed there one at a time. I believe that they placed there after 1949 after Iceland had joined NATO. The first three documents seem to show the evolution of international espionage after the war. The final document shows the justification for the lack of governmental oversight for the activity.

The question of why they were placed in Halldór’s file takes more speculation. But the inferences are clear. According to historian James Miller in his article “Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948” the CIA actively influenced the outcome of the Italian election about the same time the Laxness documents were created.

The U.S. intervention in Italy’s internal affairs took place in three stages. In the first (January to May 1947), American policymakers decided to commit a greater share of U.S. economic resources and political prestige to the person and programs of De Gasperi, the leader of the Christian Democratic party (DC), in an effort to break the deadlock within the Italian government and to promote essential reforms… At the beginning of the final stage (January to April 1948), public opinion polls predicted a Communist election victory, and the United States mounted an intensive and effective program of overt and covert action to defeat the Left (Miller 36-37).

The United States began its study on how to influence the political ideology of Iceland as early as July, 1947. Although not in Halldór’s files, I did find a file declassified State Department file (declassified in 05-2013) dated July 11, 1947 titled “Study of Possible Extension of US Aid to Iceland” (before the official beginnings of the CIA but apparently “borrowed” by the CIA since it is classified as one of their declassified documents). The document is lengthy (27 pages) and contains fears similar to what the United States had regarding Italy.

Under the heading The Communist Movement the CIA document states:

One of the most significant and disturbing factors in the Icelandic political situation is the increase in strength and influence of the communist party (p. 4).

Under the heading “Specific”

Because of the strategic importance of Iceland as a potential naval and air base the US considers Iceland to be vital to its security. Consequently, the specific objective of the US is to render permanent the present temporary arrangement, or an expanded one, but to deny the same to any unfriendly power. It is therefore desired to insure preservation of American’s long range strategic interests (p. 11).

Like Italy the CIA sought an economic “commitment”:

To prevent a sudden collapse of the living standard and consequent political unrest which might adversely affect US objective in Iceland, it may be necessary for the US to extend aid to Iceland over the next two or three years (p. 18)

Like Italy there were fears of a Communist political victory if the economy was not bolstered:

The chief beneficiary would be the Icelandic Communist Party, which would gain added strength in the country as a whole and would exert considerably greater influence in the government… (p. 20)

And, also, like Italy there was a push to endorse the policies of a particular political personage and party.

Under the heading The Stefansson Government:

The present Government, headed by a Social democrat and supported by the Conservative (business interests) and Progressives (farmers and cooperatives), is a desirable combination for US interests (p. 23).

Although Halldor’s name was not mentioned in this document there is a reference to the fears the United States had of Icelandic intellectuals:

The University is a focal point of intense nationalism, of Communist sentiment among certain intellectuals, and thus frequently a center of anti-American objectives (p. 14).

Whether any or all of the economic and political manipulations as outlined in the document were put in place, I have no idea. Was there overt and covert action in Iceland as outlined in the “justification CIA 1949 document? To use the language of the many Freedom of Information Act letters I received over the last twenty years “I cannot confirm or deny that United States had CIA operatives in Iceland between 1947-1949”.

I must admit to feeling uncomfortable going over these files. The academic scholar is cautious. But sometimes it gives way to common sense, and I am forced to admit that the United States was manipulating Iceland’s young, and fragile, political system with direct and indirect economic methods so that it would serve its own political agenda in much the same way the CIA interfered with the election in Italy. That’s not a brave conjecture since there are documents to prove this was an objective The new documents reviewed tell me that the CIA felt comforting engaging in whatever machinations needed in order to further the political goals of the United States. Whether the fears of the United States were real or imagined they justified their action.

Iceland was no Italy. It had no army and had not lost a war. Its value was that it was geographically significant. What exactly took place in discussions between the United States and Iceland from 1947 to 1949, until Iceland joined NATO? It is easy to cast the United States as the lone villain in this tale of international political intrigue. But I am curious as to what role the Icelandic leaders played in cementing a political responsibility on its people that took decades to reshape.



Works Cited:    Miller, James E. “Taking off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948.” Diplomatic History, vol. 7, no. 1, Jan. 1983, pp. 35–55. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1983.tb00381.x.

Reprinted by permission from Icelandic Connection - Vol 72  #4 

More from Chay:

The Blacklisting of Halldór Laxness